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Common Problems in Administration of
Decedents' Estates
Daniel F. Carmack*
p ROBABLY THE WORST PITFALL in the administration of dece-
dent's estates is the fact that the law relating to it has so
few pitfalls. As opposed to workmen's compensation practice, for
example, the statutes covering administration and the devolution
of decedent's property are relatively all-inclusive. There is a
statute to cover most situations, and if the lawyer will read them,
he will probably do a creditable job in most situations. This en-
courages the average practitioner to think of probate practice as
an opportunity to shoot fish in a barrel, and get well paid for do-
ing it. As we shall see, there are pitfalls and problems all along
the line; and because they are often latent, the lawyer must be
especially careful to avoid them.
The Statute of Descent and Distribution
This statute determines who is entitled to administer, and
who is entitled to notice of probate of a will, as well as who is
entitled to distribution in case of intestacy.' While it is seem-
ingly straightforward, one must interpret it with care.
This is especially true in those areas that conflict with com-
mon conceptions of what should be done with a decedent's prop-
erty. For example, most laymen would be horrified to learn that
if they died without a will and without issue, but with a parent
or parents living, their widow would not get all of their property.
Yet in such circumstances the parent or parents take 4th and
the widow S ths.2 Many people assume that a widow takes all,
whatever the family situation might be.
Similarly, many laymen believe that relatives in the genera-
tion nearest to the decedent (for example, children, or brothers
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1 Page's Ohio Revised Code, Sec. 2105.06. Hereinafter this will be cited as
Ohio Revised Code.
2 Id., Sec. 2105.06(D).
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and sisters) take to the exclusion of issue of deceased members
of their generation. And most laymen would be surprised to
know that brothers and sisters of the half-blood share equally
with brothers and sisters of the whole blood. 3 This conflict of
statute and "common sense" places upon the lawyer the duty to
take pains at the first reasonable opportunity to develop com-
pletely the family picture. If the client says that there are only
himself, and another brother and sister, don't let it go at that-
find out if there are dead brothers and sisters, and whether they
had children. If it appears that the survivors are sisters and
brothers, find out if the parents were married more than once,
and if they had children by the other marriages. With all the
divorces and remarriages we have had of recent years, this
shouldn't be too uncommon an occurrence.
Remember that ages are important, too. One of the most
dangerous and ill-founded general practices extant today is that
of listing the ages of those heirs who have reached majority
merely as "Adult." It's possible for a person to execute a will,
put it in a safety deposit box, forget it, and have more children
before he dies twenty-five or thirty years later. If you don't get
the exact ages of these now adult heirs, how are you ever going
to find a case of pretermission? It should be a fixed practice to
obtain exact ages in all cases. If it isn't, you may overlook it on
occasions when it might become important.
Don't be afraid, also, to develop all the facts about adjudi-
cations of incompetency, criminal detention, or service in the
Armed Forces. A waiver of probate obtained on visiting day at
the penitentiary will look just as good as any other, and before
you say that this is a long-shot, remember that we are hearing a
lot these days about the increased incidence of crime.
Beware of the phrase "next of kin," which can mean differ-
ent things in different parts of the Ohio Revised Code. For intes-
tate succession purposes, next of kin are determined by the rules
of the civil law. 4 Under the statute of descent, "next of kin" in-
herit on failure of all prior classes of relatives.5 Since all next of
kin, by descent, or by ascent through common ancestors of the
decedent, who are grandparents or closer, are provided for else-
8 Id., Sec. 2105.06(F).
4 Id., Sec. 2105.03.
5 Id., Sec. 2105.06(H).
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where, you needn't worry yourself about the rules of the civil
law, unless the intestate had no wife, no issue, no brothers or
sisters of the whole or half-blood, parents or grandparents, or
their lineal descendants at time of death.
Note that a lineal descendant of one grandparent (e.g., aunts
and uncles of the half-blood) do not inherit as "next of kin," 7
since the statute of descent makes no distinction between the
whole and the half-blood for this purpose.8
Civil law requires that generations be counted from the intes-
tate beginning with the parent up to the common ancestor and
then down to the particular relation.
It is a mistake, therefore, to assume that all next of kin will
be related to the same level of common ancestor. Generations
are longer in different families; so a second cousin related
through a maternal great-grandparent, and a first cousin, twice
removed, related through a paternal great-great-grandparent,
would both be related in the sixth degree. Therefore, if you are
in a next-of-kin situation, you must account for all the reason-
able possibilities of relationship in equal degrees derived from
each different level of common ancestors.
There is no representation among next of kin. This is ob-
vious because if there were representation, the degrees of con-
sanguinity would have no meaning. In other words, the term
"next of kin," for intestate succession purposes only, is under-
stood in the primary sense of those nearest to the intestate by
blood.
On the other hand, the phrase "next of kin," when used in
reference to appointment of administrators or administrators de
bonis non,9 means those who would inherit under the laws of
intestacy, and this causes a great deal of confusion. For this pur-
pose, next of kin resident of the county are second in priority
for appointment only to spouses resident of the state. Thus, rep-
resentatives of deceased members of a generation will be "next
of kin" for appointment purposes, assuming that the deceased
ancestor is a "next of kin" and assuming also that representation
applies. For example, a nephew has an equal right with a sister,
6 Id., Sec. 2105.06(A) through (G).
7 Shepard v. Wilson, 61 Ohio App. 191 (1938).
s Sheeler v. Barkhart, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 356 (1951).
9 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2113.06 and 2113.07.
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if both are resident in the county;' 0 and a grandchild, resident in
the county, is superior in right to a non-resident child." Many
lawyers interpret "next of kin" under these statutes in the sense
of those most closely related to the decedent by blood. As a re-
sult, waivers or declinations of administration are obtained only
from, for example, children resident in the county, to the exclu-
sion of resident grandchildren, whose parents are deceased. While
the statute appears to require waivers from, or citations to take
or renounce of, all persons of the same or higher priority than
the applicant as a jurisdictional matter, the courts do not seem
to so interpret it. The sense of the cases seems to be that failure
to obtain waivers or to cite is merely grounds for removal of the
administrator. Nevertheless, the careful practitioner would wish
to avoid possible removal proceedings which could only be ex-
pensive and time-consuming.
The statute of descent and distribution constantly contains
the phrase "per stirpes." As a result, lawyers fall into the trap
of being "stirpital-minded"-the idea that representatives of de-
ceased heirs should divide only what the deceased heir would
have taken, were he alive. The Legislature, however, assumes
that, an intestate decedent would want his heirs, if all are equal-
ly related by consanguinity, to share equally. 1 2 That is, if all of
the descendants of an intestate, in a direct line of descent, are
on an equal degree of consanguinity to the intestate, they share
equally "however remote such equal degree of consanguinity
may be." Note that the statute specifies that all of the descend-
ants must be on an equal degree of consanguinity. Note further
that the statute applies not only to lineal descendants, but also
to collaterals.13 Thus, first cousins who are all of the representa-
tives of deceased maternal grandparents will share equally.
Note that I was careful to specify in the last example that
the first cousins were all the representatives of maternal grand-
parents. The statute of descent in effect divides the estate into
two equal parts, when the intestate is survived by grandparents
(or their representatives) on both the maternal and paternal
sides.14 The general rules are applied separately to each half.
1o In re Estate of Applegate, 61 Ohio Law Abs. 277 (1951).
11 In re Estate of Fields, 44 Ohio Law Abs. 284 (1944).
12 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2105.12.
13 Snodgrass v. Bedell, 134 Ohio St. 311 (1938).
14 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2105.06 (G) and 2105.06 (H).
Jan., 1965
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss1/15
PROBLEMS IN DECEDENTS' ESTATES
Thus, if an intestate is survived only by six first cousins on his
father's side, and twenty first cousins on his mother's side, the
paternal cousins will each take 1/12th, and the maternal cousins,
each 1/40th. The regular rules apply on each side, however, so
that in the above example, the fact that one deceased maternal
aunt or uncle had ten children, another six and another four,
makes no difference. 1" All the first cousins share in the half pass-
ing to their side of the family, equally.
Per Stirpes or Per Capita
How do you make a stirpital division when one is called for?
The rules for this are often considered to flow from the equal
degree of consanguinity statute, but since that statute postulates
that all of the descendants must share a common degree of con-
sanguinity, it would not apply to a situation in which, by defi-
nition, the descendants are related in unequal degrees. There-
fore the stirpital rules are a manifestation of the common law and
have no real relation to the consanguinity statute discussed pre-
viously.1 6
There are three steps in determining a stirpital distribution.
First, find the generation of heirs having living members, near-
est in relationship to the intestate. This is the root generation.
Second, count the members in this generation who are living at
the time of decedent's death, as well as those who have pre-
deceased the decedent but left lineal descendants who have sur-
vived the decedent. These are the roots. Third, the living mem-
bers of the root generation take per capita in their own right;
the lineal descendants or representatives of deceased root mem-
bers take per stirpes in the right of their respective ancestors.
17
The Hall-and-Half Statute
The so-called "Half-and-Half" statute' 8 probably causes
Ohio lawyers as much trouble as anything this side of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. While it is complex, the key to a proper
understanding of the statute is gathered from its purpose to pro-
15 Snodgrass v. Bedell, supra n. 13.
16 For a scholarly discussion of this problem see White, Per Stirpes or Per
Capita, 13 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 298 (1939).
17 See Kraemer v. Hook, 168 Ohio St. 221 (1958). Although this case dealt
with testate succession, it is a good example of the applicable principles.
Is Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2105.10.
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tect the children of a deceased spouse who had transferred prop-
erty to a relict without consideration. These (and their issue)
are the primary beneficiaries of the statute, and if the relict or
intestate died without leaving issue or a surviving spouse, they
take all the identical property. There are only two other classes
of relatives of the prior-deceased spouse who are potential bene-
ficiaries and they are the parents (or the survivor of them), and
the brothers and sisters of the whole or of the half-blood (and
their lineal descendants). If the relict or intestate dies without
issue, and the prior deceased spouse likewise has no issue, the
identical property, excepting one-half, which in all cases goes to
the surviving spouse of the relict or intestate, is divided equally
between the heirs of the relict, determined as if the relict had
left no surviving spouse, and these two classes of heirs of the
prior-deceased spouse, if any, in the order specified by the stat-
ute.' 9 If there is a failure of all classes of preferred heirs of the
prior-deceased spouse, the identical property passes to the heirs
of the relict or intestate under the ordinary statutes relating to
succession to property.
The first of the several pre-requisites to the operation of this
statute is that the deceased relict must have died intestate as to
the property in question.20 Thus, if you find that the relict left
a will, you can forget "half-and-half" in most cases. Make sure,
however, that the will effectively disposes of all identical prop-
erty. If there is a lapse which results in partial intestacy as to
that property, you may have a "half-and-half" problem.
Second, the relict or intestate have had no issue, adopted
child, or designated heir. If he did, you are safely out of "half-
and-half."
Third, the intestate or relict must have held at his death
the identical property which came to him by gift, devise, legacy,
descent, or election to take against the will. Devise, descent, or
election to take against the will are fairly self-explanatory, al-
though it must be borne in mind that they are specific and exclu-
sive, and do not include other rights flowing from the marital
status, such as property exempt, or year's allowance. The prob-
lem usually involves the question of whether a transfer was ac-
19 This is the "half-and-half." It is apparent that the title is really a mis-
nomer, since it uses the result in a secondary contingency to describe the
entire law.
20 Foreman v. Bank, 119 Ohio St. 17 (1928).
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tually a gift. For example, interests which pass to the relict by
terms of a contract of the deceased spouse are not gifts.21 But
any recited consideration in a deed will defeat the characteriza-
tion of the transaction as a gift for "half-and-half" purposes,
even though the recited consideration be nominal only.
22
Identity of property is perhaps the greatest exclusionary
factor because if the relict sells the property, those claiming
through the prior-deceased spouse cannot trace assets so as to
reach the proceeds of sale or property purchased by the relict
with the proceeds.
2 3
The concept of identity presents a closer question when you
are dealing with intangibles. For example, registered securities
of a prior-deceased spouse do not lose their identity by reason
of having new certificates issued in the relict's name; the prop-
erty right is the intangible proportionate share of ownership, not
the certificate itself, which is merely evidence of title.24
The identity of property is fixed as of the relict's date of
death, and is not affected by the subsequent act of the relict's
fiduciary in selling it, or otherwise dealing in it.
The fourth general criteria is that the prior-deceased spouse
must leave issue, parent or parents, or brothers and sisters of
the whole or half-blood, or their lineal descendants, surviving
the relict or intestate.
Lapsed Testamentary Gifts
At common law, if a devisee or legatee predeceased the tes-
tator, the gift fell into the residuary clause; if there were no
residuary clause, or if it failed too, the gift passed under the
laws of intestacy.25 This has been modified by the so-called anti-
lapse statute, which generally provides that if the predeceased
legatee or devisee is a relative of the testator, who leaves issue
surviving the testator, the gift does not lapse, but passes to such
issue.26 Note that the word "relative" includes relatives by
21 Berberick v. Courtade, 137 Ohio St. 297 (1940).
22 Thiessen v. Moore, 105 Ohio St. 401 (1922).
23 Riley v. Keel, 84 Ohio App. 315 (1946).
24 Bank v. Allen, 65 Ohio Law Abs. 27 (1952).
25 Foreman v. Bank, supra n. 20; Heebsch v. Lonsway, 8 Ohio App. 36
(1947).
26 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2107.52.
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blood only, not relatives by affinity. 27 Thus, a gift to a wife, in-
law, or stepchild, who predeceases the testator, is not affected by
the anti-lapse statute and is controlled by common law rules.
It is quite common for a testator to divide the residue of his
estate among several beneficiaries; therefore, important anti-
lapse questions arise when one such beneficiary predeceases the
testator without leaving issue. If a relative who is a fractional
residual beneficiary predeceased the testator without issue, his
share shall be divided ratably among the rest of the fractional
residual beneficiaries who are relatives.2 8 The real trap in this
area was created by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bank
vs. Browning,9 which held that a gift of a fractional part of the
residue to a non-relative will not lapse, but will pass to the other
fractional recipients surviving, whether they be relatives or not.
The testator may direct to the contrary, so will draftsmen should
keep Browning in mind. One practical result of this decision is
that you will never have a total lapse when part of the residue
is given to any corporation or institution having indeterminate
life.
Pretermitted Heirs
Pretermitted heirs aren't the "bogey" they once were, since
the share of an after-born, after-adopted, an after re-appearing
child, or an after-designated heir, is restricted to his intestate
share of only that part of the estate not devised or bequeathed to
a surviving spouse. 30 It seems a necessary corollary of the prin-
ciple that a will speaks as of the date of death, that this change
applies to wills of all testators dying after the effective date of
the statute, October 5, 1961, whether or not the will was exe-
cuted after that date.
It is still necessary to keep this statute in mind, however,
when drafting a will. Suppose, for example, that a testator left
one-half of his estate to his wife, one-sixth each to his two exist-
ing children, and one-sixth to charity. He has one more child
after the will is executed and dies before he can execute a new
will. Under the pretermitted heir statute, the after-born child
would be entitled to one-third of one-half, or one-sixth (i.e. his
27 Schaeffer v. Bernhardt, 76 Ohio St. 443 (1907).
28 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2107.52 (second sentence).
29 158 Ohio St. 54 (1952).
30 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2107.34.
Jan., 1965
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intestate share of the part not devised to the widow, calculated
under the clause of the statute of descent and distribution, which
would be effective had the testator not left a spouse surviving).
The other children and the charity would be required to con-
tribute ratably, leaving them each with only 1/9th. As between
the children, this would probably be an unjust result.
There is another reason why it is important to provide al-
ways for all children, whether they are after-born or not. Most
states have pretermitted child statutes, and not all of them are
like Ohio's. For example, under California law, a child born
anytime, either before or after the will, is pretermitted, unless
the will shows a clear intent to disinherit him. Since testators
may move out of Ohio, careful attorneys should anticipate this
possibility and specifically provide for all children.
Hearings on Schedules of Debts
The court may inquire into the propriety of the executor's
(or administrator's) allowances and classifications of claims;
notice must be given to the surviving spouse and all others hav-
ing an interest in the estate as devisees, legatees, heirs, and dis-
tributees.31 If it appears that the estate is insolvent, creditors
and rejected claimants must also be notified. A final order con-
firming the allowance or classification has the same effect as a
judgment binding all persons having notice of the hearing; and
in the absence of fraud such allowances and classifications, and
payments pursuant thereto, shall not be questioned on the exec-
utor's (or administrator's) accounts. 32
The primary utility of this statute is in insolvent situations
in which it is desired that the creditors know why they are not
being paid in full, and that they may be bound by an order fix-
ing priorities. But suppose there is a claim which is probably
but not certainly valid, to which the widow objects bitterly. A
rejection could easily involve the estate in litigation at consider-
able expense and loss of time. If the executor allows the claim
and has a hearing on the schedule of debts, the widow can pre-
sent her side. If the Court sustains the allowance, the fiduciary
is absolutely protected in paying the claim, in the absence of
fraud.
81 Id., Sec. 2117.17.
82 Ibid.
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On the other hand if a borderline claim is probably not
allowable, a rejection would likely bring a separate lawsuit. If
the fiduciary is sure that another party is ready, willing and able
to oppose the claim, he might allow the claim to have a hearing
on the schedule of debts. Do this only in borderline cases. Note
that if the claim is rejected by the court, the claimant still has
his right in common pleas, municipal, or county court; but many
people merely want their day in court, and are satisfied if they
get any kind of a fair and impartial hearing.
Determination of Heirship
This action is a full-blown civil action, complete with service
of process and pleadings.83 It is really in the nature of an inter-
pleader because the fiduciary, as such, has no interest in who
gets the property, although he has a duty to find the heirs, or
unnamed devisees, in a situation where a gift is made to a class.
The fiduciary may make final distribution in reliance on the
court's determination, and with his bondsman, be discharged
from liability arising from such determined interest, and that the
title to any property thereupon purchased from such fiduciary,
shall be free from such determined interest.84
Whenever there is a class of beneficiaries more remotely
related to the decedent than grandparents, heirship proceedings
should be considered. This would always depend somewhat on
your ability to account for all of the family members and their
descendants, but whenever you find a great number of members
in the root generation, leaving a plenitude of descendants who
will probably inherit, determination of heirship is in order.
Second, proceedings to determine heirship should be initi-
ated at the earliest date commensurate with a diligent effort to
find the heirs. Often, effective action is dependent upon giving
notice to the heirs, and this would be especially true when a land
sale is necessary. It is a common practice to join unknown heirs
and devisees of persons whom everyone has lost track of, as de-
fendants in land sale proceedings, and there is some authority for
this. It does seem the better practice, however, to obtain a de-
termination of heirship first. For one thing, Section 2123.02, Re-
vised Code, specifically requires the joining in determination
8 Ohio Rev. Code, Ch. 2123.
84 Id., Sec. 2123.07.
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proceedings of heirs and distributees whose names are unknown.
For another, the purchaser is protected, by an heirship determi-
nation. Heirship should therefore be determined prior to insti-
tuting a land sale in all situations when it would be sought in
any case.
Note that the court determines not only the identity of the
heirs, but also what proportion each takes.35
Don't confuse the presumed decedent's law,3 0 with heirship
determination. If the decedent had a son, who had been absent
from his residence without word for eight years prior to the de-
cedent's death, don't seek a finding of presumed death under the
presumed decedent's law. Heirship determination is the proper
remedy, otherwise an action under the presumed decedent's law,
would, in effect, resuscitate a man the common law had consid-
ered dead, so as to make him an heir. This follows from the fact
that the presumptive date of death under the presumed dece-
dent's law is the date of entry of the first decree of presumed
death. To put it another way, the presumed decedent's law does
not repeal the common law rule of presumption of death. This
remains for use whenever the occasion demands in other actions,
including determination of heirship. The presumed decedent's
law is the vehicle for obtaining a declaration of death, only in
those cases where administration is contemplated for a person
who possessed an estate in his own right.37
Declaratory Judgments
Actions for declaratory judgment 8 and actions to construe
a will 9 both give the probate court wide powers to determine
controversies involved in the administration of estates. In fact,
declaratory judgment relief40 is so broad that it encompasses
almost all of the power of the probate court to render judgment
relative to decedent's estates under other sections of the Revised
Code.
Declaratory judgment is a most useful tool, and it ought to
be used in all cases where the title to personal property is at
35 Speidel v. Schaller, 73 Ohio App. 141 (1943).
36 Ohio Rev. Code. Ch. 2121.
87 See Baker v. Myers, 160 Ohio St. 376 (1953).
8 Ohio Rev. Code, Ch. 2721.
89 Id., Sec. 2107.46.
40 Id., Sec. 2721.03 and 2721.05.
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issue, and the claim of the opposition is not so tinged with wrong-
fulness or criminality that concealment of assets41 would apply.
Problems Relating to Land
Land is not, strictly speaking, part of the probate estate,
since it descends immediately upon death to the heirs or dev-
isees, subject only to the duty of the executor or administrator
to reach it for payment of the decedent's debts. Very often, how-
ever, the primary reason for having an administration is to clear
title to real estate. Therefore, it seems to me that the goal of the
lawyer for the estate which includes real estate (and here I am
using the word "estate" in its non-technical sense) should be to
present the heirs a title of record in the county where the land
is situated, free of cloud insofar as the probate proceedings are
concerned. For that reason, it seems to be good practice to have
the abstract continued, or to procure a title certificate at the out-
set, whether or not land sale proceedings are expected. It is
quite possible that items such as a federal tax lien, sales tax or
unemployment compensation lien, would be unearthed that
might not otherwise come to your attention. Remember that
presentation of personal property and intangible tax claims is
required only within ninety days of the receipt by the Tax Com-
missioner of the preliminary notice for inheritance tax pur-
poses.42 Otherwise, the State is not required to present claims,
and in any case, claims secured by lien need not be presented.
The heirs might be justifiably unhappy, if they were presented
with a claim by the State, when they thought their title had
been rendered free and clear in the probate court.
The courts of many counties require the production of a
certificate of title for all real estate of the decedent. It also has
the admirable side effect of impelling the client into a lawyer's
office.
The admission of wills to record is required in the probate
court of each county wherein real estate of the testator is situ-
ated; 43 there is permissive authority to admit wills proved in for-
eign states or territories to record in the county of situs. 44 More
41 Id., Sec. 2109.50.
42 Id., Sec. 2117.06.
43 Id., Sec. 2107.21.
44 Id., Sec. 2129.05.
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important is the permissive authority to present for record au-
thenticated copies of the record of extra-county administration
proceedings in the probate court of each county where the dece-
dent owned real estate.45 This statute is commonly overlooked.
Most Franklin and Cuyahoga County title examiners will, prob-
ably, require that extra-county proceedings be put of record in
the county, but most other counties, have instances of extra-
county administrations, which were not recorded under this
statute. To minimize the burden on individual heirs who would
have to pay for such extra-county investigations, it ought to be
part of the ordinary procedure to file the authenticated record
in any county wherein the decedent owns realty.
A little known provision gives the surviving spouse the right
to purchase the mansion house, and subject to limitations, other
personal and real estate, at their appraised value.46 More golden
opportunities for easy, legally unassailable answers are missed
here through sheer ignorance than anywhere else. In nine cases
out of ten, when lawyers are scrounging around looking for
some way to dispose of real estate, for example selling it to pay
costs of administration, it is because they didn't take advantage
of the widow's election. Unless financial considerations render it
impossible, a residence should never remain with minor heirs
where a spouse survives. Since the spouse has credits of one-
third to one-half by intestacy, in addition to property exempt,
and if she is a widow-year's allowance, and possibly funeral
expenses paid by insurance, these instances of financial impos-
sibility would be few in number.
The election must be filed within thirty days after the inven-
tory is approved, not filed. This will be important in counties
where notice of hearing on the inventory is given by publication,
and perhaps thirty days or more intervene between filing and
approval.
Suppose a home-made will leaves a residence or some other
real estate in trust-with no power of sale-for some improvi-
dent or sub-competent child. Waste, wear and tear, or general
economic conditions, at some time will oblige a prudent man
trustee to sell this item. How can it be done? The probate code
merely says that the Probate Court has jurisdiction to "author-
45 Id., Sec. 2129.01.
46 Id., Sec. 2113.38.
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ize the sale or lease of any estate created by will if the estate is
held in trust on petition by trustee." 47
It is submitted that the answer is not in the probate code,
but in the sections of the Revised Code relating to disentailment
proceedings. 4  Obviously a trust is not a common law entail-
ment; but these sections clearly were intended to cover situa-
tions other than strict entailment. The use of the word "dis-
entailed" in the popular name is merely a convenience.
Attorney's Fees
There are several factors which contribute to the proper
determination of an attorney's administration fee, but one of
them, that is, responsibility, or size of the estate, has been over-
emphasized, to the extent that the unwary may be confused.
There is a good reason for this. Clients like to know where they
stand on fees, and it is nice to be able to tell them at the first
conference, that the probate court allows 6% of the first $1,000,
4% of the next $4,000, etc., or 5% of the first $5,000, etc., accord-
ing to the formula followed in the particular court. Percentages
are easily understood and computed; but percentages totally
ignore such other relevant criteria as time spent, difficulties en-
countered, the art or expertise with which the services were
performed, and the results achieved. An advantageous settle-
ment of a creditor's claim, or the relinquishment of a federal tax
assessment, for example, should be considered when calculating
the fee. Fee schedules, then, are guides, not absolute criteria, as
are the statutory commissions for ordinary services of the fidu-
ciary.49
While many lawyers and judges categorize attorney fees into
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" fees, this is a distinction un-
known to the law. Thus, an application and entry for attorney
fees should never seek and grant the percentage figure for
"ordinary" fees, and some additional sum for "extraordinary"
services. An entire fee for all services should be sought and
allowed.
Fee schedules probably will never be abandoned. After all,
they are useful. But evidence must be presented to support an
47 Id., Sec. 2101.24(N).
48 Id., Sec. 5303.21 if.
49 Id., Sec. 2113.35.
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allowance of attorney fees.50 For this reason, every lawyer han-
dling probate matters should keep track of his time spent and
otherwise be prepared to detail the basis on which he values his
services, even if he plans to fix his charge on the basis of a court
rule, or a bar association fee schedule. Furthermore, he should
explain to the executor or administrator, again at the initial con-
ference, that while the particular schedule is a guide, there are
other factors, perhaps unseen, which might increase the fee.
Failure to do this probably accounts for the controversies about
fees, which occasionally crop up. The client is not made to un-
derstand that he has not been given a quotation, in the nature of
a contractor's or garageman's bid.
Taxes
It is true, I think, that one of the most common pitfalls in
probate practice is the assumption that probate practice is one
thing and tax practice is another. Taxes, particularly federal
income, estate, and gift taxes, are mystical and mysterious to
many. But they cannot be divorced from probate practice and a
satisfactory service done for the client. We are often at a loss to
show the client what we have accomplished for him. The nu-
ances of a clear and marketable title are apt to escape him, but
he does understand money, that is, tax deductions, tax discounts,
and tax avoidance. One striking example of a golden opportu-
nity for a probate lawyer to show his client a tangible return of
this nature is the provision which may permit the heirs, distrib-
utees, or residual beneficiaries, to deduct the costs of adminis-
tration, including attorney fees, from their adjusted gross income
for federal income tax purposes in the year during which distri-
bution is made if the estate or trust cannot use it.51 In other
words, they can pay your fee and make the federal government
eat it, too. To me, this example points out, better than any other,
the theme which we have all been hearing for many years-"Get
acquainted with your tax laws, both state and federal."
50 In re Estate of Verbeck, 173 Ohio St. 557 (1962).
51 Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 642(h) (1954), 26 U. S. Code, Sec. 642(h).
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
